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THE COLLATERAL EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL
ORDERS OF PROTECTION ON PARENT
DEFENDANTS IN CASES OF INTIMATE PARTNER
VIOLENCE
Isabelle Leipziger*
Intimate partner violence is a serious public health problem that affects
people from all cultures, ethnicities, and socioeconomic backgrounds.
Although courts have historically refused to get involved due to the intimate
and private nature of these offenses, widespread reforms have led to some
judicial intervention. Through the issuance of criminal orders of protection,
courts have alleviated some of the difficulties associated with prosecuting
cases of intimate partner violence and have provided immediate protection
for victims. However, criminal orders of protection also pose significant
challenges for defendants who live and co-parent with their accuser.
In New York, issuance of these orders is often a procedural default in
criminal court, and their impact on criminal defendants can be significant,
leaving many defendants—often people of color from low socioeconomic
backgrounds—without a place to live. These orders are even more
consequential for defendants who are parents, as they can effectively
separate parents from their children and deprive them of their fundamental
right to parent. In order to limit the consequences that stem from these
criminal orders of protection, courts must be clear about the procedural
protections and evidentiary standards required and must ensure that parent
defendants are afforded these protections before issuing a criminal order of
protection. Recently, the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate
Division, First Judicial Department, held in Crawford v. Ally that where a
temporary order of protection would deprive a defendant of significant
property or liberty interests, the court must hold an evidentiary hearing in
order to protect the defendant’s due process rights. Although this decision
was a step in the right direction, its vague language left room for judges to
skirt the new requirements. This Note considers Crawford and its effect on
parent defendants, positing that a legislative response that codifies the First
* J.D. Candidate, 2023, Fordham University School of Law; B.S., 2017, Cornell University.
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Department’s recent decision would address some of the concerns
surrounding criminal orders of protection and would ensure that parent
defendants are afforded adequate protections when they are accused of
intimate partner violence.
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INTRODUCTION
At the time of her arrest, Shamika Crawford was the mother of a
ten-year-old daughter and a five-year-old son.1 Ms. Crawford worked two
jobs in order to support herself and her family.2 The father of her children,
Keivian Mayers, sometimes stayed with her in her apartment, which she
shared with her children and her sixteen-year-old brother.3 On November 3,
2019, officers arrested Ms. Crawford after Mr. Mayers accused her of
assaulting him.4 At her arraignment, the Bronx County Criminal Court
1. Brief for Petitioner at 6, Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712 (App. Div. 2021) (No.
2020-04520).
2. Id. at 10. Ms. Crawford worked as a caretaker for individuals with developmental and
intellectual disabilities. Id. at 6.
3. Id. at 6–7.
4. Id. at 7.
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issued a temporary order of protection5 (TOP) prohibiting her from
contacting Mr. Mayers and ordering her to stay away from their “shared”
residence.6 Although she was legally free to leave, the TOP prevented her
from returning home.7 Unable to go home, where was she supposed to go?
How would she care for and maintain her relationship with her children? For
Ms. Crawford, “freedom” meant living in her car and sleeping on her friend’s
couch.8
In criminal cases, prosecutors often request a TOP as a pretrial precaution
to immediately shield victims9 from the alleged abuse.10 Typically, the TOP
remains in place for the duration of the case, but judges can modify or
terminate the order at their discretion.11 For many individuals, however, a
TOP becomes a “sentence unto itself” because of the restrictions imposed by
the order.12 In Ms. Crawford’s case, she was left unhoused and separated
from her two young children because of an unsubstantiated misdemeanor
assault complaint signed by Mr. Mayers.13 With the TOP in place and her
criminal case still pending, Ms. Crawford did not see her children for months
and only kept in contact with her daughter over the phone.14
At Ms. Crawford’s arraignment, prosecutors requested a full stay-away
order,15 and the court granted this request.16 Five days later, Bronx County
Criminal Court Judge Shahabuddeen Ally denied Ms. Crawford’s request for
a modification of the order of protection and refused to hold an evidentiary
hearing to substantiate the allegations in the complaint and show that a full

5. The term for temporary orders of protection varies by jurisdiction. Jeannie Suk,
Criminal Law Comes Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2, 7 n.10 (2006). This Note refers to temporary
orders of protection, stay-away orders, no-contact orders, and restraining orders
interchangeably. These orders can be issued either in the civil or criminal context. See id. at
15–16.
6. See Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 714–15 (App. Div. 2021). Mr. Mayers
periodically stayed with Ms. Crawford in her apartment, but he was not listed on the lease and
was not legally authorized to reside there. See id. at 715.
7. Andy Newman, Barred from Her Own Home: How a Tool for Fighting Domestic
Abuse Fails, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/17/nyregion/
order-of-protection-domestic-violence-abuse.html [https://perma.cc/3AMY-CQX3].
8. See id. Moreover, a full stay-away order meant that she was not only deprived of her
property, but also separated from her children. Id.
9. This Note refers to individuals who have experienced IPV as “victims” solely for
clarity, but with the recognition that these individuals are “survivors” and are not defined by
the abuse that has been perpetrated against them.
10. See Newman, supra note 7.
11. Carolyn N. Ko, Civil Restraining Orders for Domestic Violence: The Unresolved
Question of “Efficacy,” 11 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 361, 364 (2002).
12. Newman, supra note 7.
13. See id.
14. Interview by Eli Salamon-Abrams, Co-President of Fordham L. Defs., and Yash
Ramesh, Intergroup Coordinator of Fordham L. Defs., with Shamika Crawford and Edward
Soto, at Fordham Univ. Sch. of L. in New York, N.Y. (March 3, 2021).
15. Under a full stay-away order of protection, the parties must “stay away” from each
other and may not contact each other “directly or through third parties.” Orders of Protection,
N.Y.S. OFF. FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://opdv.ny.gov/ordersprotection [https://perma.cc/MVS5-WWYP] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
16. See Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 714 (App. Div. 2021).
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TOP was necessary.17 A couple of months later, with the full stay-away order
still in place, Ms. Crawford sought a writ of mandamus directing the Bronx
County Criminal Court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the appropriateness
and scope of the TOP issued in her case.18 Ms. Crawford’s application was
dismissed as moot following the dismissal of her criminal case in March
2020.19 On appeal, the First Department found an exception to the mootness
doctrine and held that the criminal court’s initial failure to hold an evidentiary
hearing violated Ms. Crawford’s due process rights.20
Ms. Crawford’s situation is not unusual.21 Thousands of New Yorkers
face similar challenges every year.22 In 2019, there were over 230,000 orders
of protection issued in family court and criminal court.23 The issuance of
these TOPs have disproportionately affected New York’s communities of
color.24 Although these orders have protected those in dangerous situations,
criminal orders of protection have also deprived defendants of significant
protected interests without giving them the opportunity to refute the
allegations against them.25 This presents a serious due process issue,
particularly for defendants who are the parents of young children.26
This Note focuses on criminal orders of protection in New York and
analyzes the First Department’s recent decision in Crawford v. Ally,27 which
held that a hearing is necessary to safeguard a defendant’s due process rights
where a TOP would not only deprive defendants of their homes but also
separate them from their children.28 This Note argues that Crawford was a
step in the right direction, but that more is needed to protect the rights of
parent defendants. This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the
prevalence of intimate partner violence (IPV), its effects, and the legal
system’s response. Part I also explains the decision in Crawford. Part II then
examines the rights of parent defendants in cases of IPV and explains how
criminal orders of protection present a challenge to those rights. Part III
17. See id. at 716.
18. Id. at 715.
19. Id. at 716.
20. Id. at 717.
21. See generally Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant at 8–29, Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712 (App. Div. 2021) (No.
2020-04520) (describing stories of other individuals who were left without a home upon the
issuance of a full order of protection in cases where the charges were ultimately dismissed).
22. Id. at 3.
23. N.Y. STATE OFF. FOR THE PREVENTION OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, NEW YORK STATE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE DASHBOARD 2019, at 8, https://opdv.ny.gov/system/files/
documents/2021/09/opdv-dashboard-2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WW4-Q5W4]. Statistics
on the number of criminal orders of protection issued in New York are not available, but this
number reflects the orders of protection issued in family court and in domestic violence cases
in criminal court that were required for entry in the New York State Order of Protection
Registry pursuant to section 221-a of the New York Executive Law. Id.
24. See Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 21, at 5–7.
25. See id. at 3.
26. See infra Part II.A.
27. 150 N.Y.S.3d 712 (App. Div. 2021).
28. Id. at 717.
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argues that the decision in Crawford was regrettably vague and risks the
possibility that courts will allow violations of defendants’ rights. Part III
contends that Crawford was a good decision, but that stricter procedural
protections and a higher evidentiary standard are necessary to fully safeguard
parent defendants’ constitutional rights.
I. ORDERS OF PROTECTION AS REMEDIES FOR IPV
Intimate partner violence—which the Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention classifies as a serious public health problem29—affects millions
of individuals in the United States.30 Although traditionally recognized as
instances of physical or sexual violence between intimate partners, IPV can
also include threats, economic abuse, and emotional or psychological
abuse.31
Before the 1970s, violence in the home was generally not considered to be
within “the reach of criminal law.”32 Judges declined to intervene in what
they deemed a private family matter.33 In addition to issues of privacy,
warrantless arrest laws34 precluded officers from arresting a defendant on
allegations of a misdemeanor where officers did not witness the act
themselves.35 This presented a substantial barrier because most acts of IPV
are not committed in the presence of a police officer.36 Without the
involvement of criminal courts, victims were left with the limited remedy of
29. See Fast Facts: Preventing Intimate Partner Violence, CTRS. FOR DISEASE
CONTROL & PREVENTION (Nov. 21, 2021), https://www.cdc.gov/violenceprevention/
intimatepartnerviolence/fastfact.html [https://perma.cc/FY2G-UUCS] (classifying intimate
partner violence as a serious health problem). Aside from the risk of injury and death, IPV
also significantly increases the risk of other mental and physical health problems, including
cardiovascular problems, diabetes, depression, stroke, and asthma. See Intimate Partner
Violence (IPV), NYC HEALTH, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/doh/providers/resources/publichealth-action-kits-ipv.page [https://perma.cc/TX2Z-T9MN] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
30. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (2020),
https://assets.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/domestic_violence-2020080709350855.pdf?
1596828650457 [https://perma.cc/VNJ3-B3VS] (noting that, in the United States, more than
ten million adults experience domestic violence annually).
31. Id. By engaging in psychologically abusive behavior, abusers seek to isolate their
victims from support networks, strip away their independence, and micromanage their daily
life. See Erin Sheley, Criminalizing Coercive Control Within the Limits of Due Process, 70
DUKE L.J. 1321, 1323–24 (2021) (discussing behavior known as “coercive control”).
32. See Suk, supra note 5, at 11–12 (“Indeed wife beating, as a form of chastisement and
discipline of wives, was overtly approved and reserved as a right of the man of the house.”);
Hannah Brenner, Transcending the Criminal Law’s One Size Fits All Response to Domestic
Violence, 19 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 301, 302–03 (2013) (describing the shift from
domestic violence as a private matter “confined within the four walls of the home” to a public
matter addressed by the legal system).
33. See Sally F. Goldfarb, Violence Against Women and the Persistence of Privacy, 61
OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 47 (2000) (citing congressional testimony by the National Organization for
Women Legal Defense and Education Fund in support of the Violence Against Women Act).
34. See D. KELLY WEISBERG, MODERN FAMILY LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 332
(7th ed. 2020) (“A police officer could make a warrantless arrest for a misdemeanor only in
cases in which the suspect committed the criminal act in the officer’s presence.”).
35. See id.
36. See id.
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seeking an order of protection in family court—an arduous process that was
initially available only to married individuals.37
The women’s rights movement aimed to help women suffering from IPV
as part of its larger goal of increasing autonomy and independence for
women.38 The movement’s work led to statutory reforms that strengthened
the legal response to IPV.39 One such reform focused on eliminating
warrantless arrest laws.40 Some jurisdictions went so far as to mandate arrest
in cases of IPV.41 Legislatures enacted mandatory arrest laws in order to
limit the discretion of law enforcement and ensure the protection of victims
from their abusers.42 In the early years, criminal law reforms were
implemented to punish offenders who commit violent acts, prevent future
acts of violence, and empower victims to stand up against their abusers.43 In
addition to mandatory arrest laws, which limited the discretion of law
enforcement officers, some jurisdictions sought to limit prosecutorial
discretion by following “hard” no-drop policies requiring prosecutors to
proceed in an IPV case regardless of a victim’s wishes.44 Issuing temporary
orders of protection in conjunction with an ongoing criminal case is one of
the ways in which courts have stepped in to address IPV.45
Part I of this Note explores IPV and the legal system’s response. Part I.A
discusses the prevalence and severity of IPV in the United States, specifically
in New York. Part I.B reviews the legal system’s response to IPV through
civil and criminal orders of protection, with a focus on criminal orders of
protection in cases where there is an allegation of physical violence. Part I.C
then discusses the First Department’s decision in Crawford.

37. See Suk, supra note 5, at 13 n.29.
38. See David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and
Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1451 (2010). But see Aya Gruber, The
Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 750 (2007) (describing feminist criminal law
reform as “increasingly mirror[ing] the victims’ rights movement and its criminalization
goals”). Professor Gruber argues that, instead of increasing autonomy, the domestic violence
system treats women with “paternalism and disdain, as more advocates and jurists buy into
the belief that female victims are weak, damaged, and unable to recognize their own interests.”
Id. at 751.
39. See Brenner, supra note 32, at 303.
40. See WEISBERG, supra note 34, at 332.
41. See id. at 333.
42. See Suk, supra note 5, at 12.
43. See EVA SCHLESINGER BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE 6 (3d ed. 2002).
44. See WEISBERG, supra note 34, at 333. Other jurisdictions adopted more lenient “‘soft’
no-drop policies, in which prosecutors merely encouraged (but did not force) victims to
proceed and provided them with support services.” Id. Although the impetus for civil
protection orders arose out of the women’s rights movement, women are not always the victim
in situations of IPV. See Corey Nichols-Hadeed, Catherine Cerulli, Kimberly Kaukeinen,
Karin V. Rhodes & Jacquelyn Campbell, Assessing Danger: What Judges Need to Know, 50
FAM. CT. REV. 150, 151 (2012) (noting that men can also be victims of IPV even though it is
more common for victims to be women).
45. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1454.
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A. The Prevalence of IPV
About one in five women experience “severe physical violence” from an
intimate partner in their lifetime.46 According to the National Coalition
Against Domestic Violence (NCADV), IPV is “prevalent in every
community and affects people regardless of age, socioeconomic status,
sexual orientation, gender, race, religion, or nationality.”47 In New York,
31.7 percent of women and 29 percent of men experience IPV in their
lifetimes.48 In 2018, New York City police officers responded to 250,447
domestic incidents, and officers in the rest of New York State responded to
182,893 domestic incidents.49 Every year, New York City emergency rooms
treat approximately 4,000 women and 900 men following IPV-related
incidents.50 Additionally, 44 percent of the women killed in New York City
each year are killed by their intimate partners.51 Where an abuser has access
to a firearm, intimate partner femicide increases by 400 percent.52 In 2018,
IPV accounted for 20 percent of all violent crime.53
IPV affects children as well. Futures Without Violence, a health and social
justice nonprofit organization, estimates that 275 million children worldwide
are exposed to IPV in the home.54 15.5 million children live with families in
which IPV occurred at least once in the past year, and “seven million children
live with families in which severe IPV has occurred.”55 In incidents of IPV
involving female victims, children live in the home 43 percent of the time.56
46. Fast Facts: Preventing Intimate Partner Violence, supra note 29.
47. NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 30. There are, however, some
racial differences. See Brenner, supra note 32, at 311–12 (“American Indian and Alaskan
Native women experience a higher rate of violence than any other group, including
African-American men and other marginalized groups.” (quoting Sarah Deer, Sovereignty of
the Soul: Exploring the Intersection of Rape Law Reform and Federal Indian Law, 38
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 455, 456 (2005))).
48. See NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN NEW YORK
(2020),
https://assets.speakcdn.com/assets/2497/ncadv_new_york_fact_sheet_2020.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XP7R-FE3A].
49. Id.
50. Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), supra note 29.
51. Id.
52. See NAT’L COAL. AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, supra note 30; see also Julia
Hatheway, Note, Disarming Abusers and Triggering the Sixth Amendment: Are Domestic
Violence Misdemeanants Guaranteed the Right to a Jury Trial?, 90 FORDHAM L. REV. 179,
182 (2021) (discussing an increase in lethality in situations involving firearms).
53. RACHEL E. MORGAN & BARBARA A. OUDEKERK, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2018, at 4
(2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv18.pdf [https://perma.cc/5WUP-MTUB].
There is also evidence to suggest that the prevalence of IPV has increased since 2018. See
Caroline Newman, The Pandemic Is Increasing Intimate Partner Violence. Here Is How
Health Care Providers Can Help., UAB NEWS (Oct. 21, 2020), https://www.uab.edu/
news/health/item/12390-the-pandemic-is-increasing-intimate-partner-violence-here-is-howhealth-care-providers-can-help [https://perma.cc/2WMA-2C6F] (suggesting an increase in
domestic violence cases globally and locally).
54. FUTURES WITHOUT VIOLENCE, THE FACTS ON CHILDREN AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
(2008),
https://www.futureswithoutviolence.org/userfiles/file/Children_and_Families/
Children.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUA3-3YTF].
55. Id.
56. Id.
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The impact that exposure to IPV can have on children is long-lasting and
devastating.57
B. Legal Responses
Historically, individuals were only able to seek a civil order of protection
against an intimate partner by initiating a divorce proceeding.58 This
wrongly assumed that IPV happened only between married couples and
failed to provide any sort of protection for people in abusive, nonmarital
relationships.59 Following the push to address IPV in the home through
statutory reforms,60 the New York State Legislature passed the Family Court
Act61 (FCA) in 1962.62 The FCA created the modern family court system
and granted courts jurisdiction to hear justiciable family-related disputes,
without limitations based on parties’ marital status.63 Importantly, the FCA
gave courts the authority to issue orders of protection in proceedings separate
from cases involving child support or custody issues.64 The process of
seeking an order of protection through family court was intended to be
accessible to pro se litigants requiring immediate protection.65 However,
there is conflicting research on whether protective orders have been
successful at decreasing subsequent physical violence.66 Following the
FCA’s enactment, individuals could seek an ex parte civil protection order
against their abusive partner by filing a petition in family court.67 Should the
court issue a TOP at the preliminary hearing, the named respondent is then
served with the order and is given the opportunity to be heard at the next
court date.68

57. See infra Part II.B.3.
58. Ruth Colker, Marriage Mimicry: The Law of Domestic Violence, 47 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1841, 1844–45 (2006) (“Legislatures first began to provide legal recourse to married
women who were victims of domestic violence in the 1970s and 1980s through the
development of warrantless arrest statutes, the availability of civil protection orders, and the
funding of battered women’s shelters.”).
59. See Suk, supra note 5, at 13 n.29.
60. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1452 (describing the initiation of class actions against
police officers who refuse to arrest abusers and the promotion of mandatory arrest laws,
“no-drop” policies, and warrantless arrest laws as advocacy strategies).
61. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT (McKinney 2022).
62. Id. Some scholars have been critical of the FCA because it “effectively decriminalized
domestic violence by stripping the New York criminal courts of jurisdiction” over such acts,
since IPV was still viewed as a private matter that should not be dealt with in criminal court.
See, e.g., Jaros, supra note 38, at 1453 n.47 (citing Judith A. Smith, Battered Non-Wives and
Unequal Protection-Order Coverage: A Call for Reform, 23 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 127
(2005)).
63. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1453.
64. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT §§ 841–842.
65. See LEIGH GOODMARK, A TROUBLED MARRIAGE: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE
LEGAL SYSTEM 88 (2013). However, securing such orders without the assistance of counsel
has proved challenging for many victims seeking protection. Id. at 89 (“[W]omen are far more
successful in obtaining protective orders when they are represented.”).
66. See id. at 88.
67. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1453–54.
68. See Ko, supra note 11, at 365.
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Two years after its passage, the FCA was amended to permit family court
judges to issue a preliminary TOP prior to the adjudicatory hearing “for good
cause shown.”69 The “good cause” requirement served as a procedural
safeguard for the alleged perpetrator of abuse.70 In a recent case before the
First Department, the court held that a father showed good cause for a tailored
TOP based on a petition alleging that the respondent sent him several
unsolicited messages threatening to leave with their child, to destroy his
property, and to leave the child unattended.71
Courts in New York also use a standard of good cause when deciding
whether to extend an order of protection.72 Although “good cause” is not
defined in the statute, the legislature has noted that, in granting a request for
an extension of a TOP, courts should consider the present circumstances of a
case, past abuse, threats of abuse, and any information that is relevant to
ensuring the petitioner’s safety and preventing a recurrence of abuse.73 In
Jacobs v. Jacobs,74 the Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate
Division, Second Judicial Department, found that there was good cause to
extend a TOP based on evidence that the respondent’s statements to the
petitioner’s employer caused a “significant police response” to the
petitioner’s home in the presence of her eight-year-old son.75 The court
extended the TOP after determining that there was credible evidence that the
respondent “continued to interfere with petitioner’s peaceful existence and
well-being” through means other than direct contact.76
A civil order of protection can prohibit an alleged abuser from contacting
the victim and require them to vacate the shared home—even if that
individual owns the property.77 These orders may vary widely in scope and
length, but they generally cover a wider range of concerns than criminal
orders of protection do.78 When there are children in the home, civil orders
of protection may have implications for child custody.79
The advent of civil protection orders marked an important step toward
greater protections for individuals in abusive relationships, allowing those
who have experienced the abuse to remain in their homes (while excluding
69. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 828 (McKinney 2022).
70. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1454.
71. See Matthew P. v. Linnea W., 154 N.Y.S.3d 59, 61 (App. Div. 2021).
72. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 842.
73. See Molloy v. Molloy, 24 N.Y.S.3d 333, 337–38 (App. Div. 2016).
74. 90 N.Y.S.3d 131 (App Div. 2018).
75. Id. at 133.
76. Id.
77. See Suk, supra note 5, at 14 n.30 (describing exclusion of abusers from their family
homes as “perhaps the key provision of protection order statutes” (quoting PETER FINN &
SARAH COLSON, CIVIL PROTECTION ORDERS: LEGISLATION, CURRENT COURT PRACTICE, AND
ENFORCEMENT 33 (1990))). A “practical obstacle to avoiding continued violence” occurs
when victims share a home with their abuser. Id. at 14.
78. See Leigh S. Goodmark, Law Is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?:
Questioning the Efficacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L.
REV. 7, 10 (2004) (explaining that civil protection orders provide more comprehensive relief
than criminal protection orders).
79. See WEISBERG, supra note 34, at 325.
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their abusers) and to regain a sense of autonomy and safety.80 Studies have
shown that obtaining orders of protection can have a positive psychological
effect on victims,81 but there are many methodological issues with these
studies, and they may not be representative of the population.82 Still, civil
protection orders for victims of IPV may be one of the few widely available
interventions that have demonstrated effectiveness.83
Although the FCA and its amendments provided a path toward autonomy
and safety for victims of IPV in family court, the lack of overlap between
family court and criminal court created a concern that individuals would feel
pressured to choose between seeking redress through the family court
system—which unquestionably had the authority to issue civil orders of
protection—and pursuing charges against their abusers in criminal court.84
Yet for some victims, it may be important to pursue criminal charges to hold
their abusers accountable with a criminal conviction.85 Thus, in 1977, the
New York State Legislature authorized criminal courts to issue criminal
protective orders in cases alleging a narrow set of “family offense” crimes86
between household members.87 This meant that a victim of IPV could press
charges and receive a protective order against their abuser for the duration of
the criminal case.
Civil orders of protection provide a remedy for individuals who voluntarily
go to court to seek assistance where law enforcement officers have not
necessarily made an arrest, whereas criminal orders of protection are
typically granted postarrest at the prosecutor’s request as a condition of
pretrial release.88 Criminal orders of protection constitute an important legal
response to IPV, as they are often an effective and efficient means of
80. See Suk, supra note 5, at 14.
81. See Ko, supra note 11, at 369–70 (describing studies revealing improvements in
emotional well-being and an increased sense of security in women who obtained orders of
protection against their abusers).
82. See id. at 369–71. There are also studies that “confirm the common perception that
[orders of protection] are ineffective.” Id. at 372–73.
83. See Goodmark, supra note 78, at 11 (discussing recent study in which lead researcher
noted the effectiveness of civil orders of protection).
84. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1454. In New York, however, individuals may
“commence a proceeding in either or both Family Court and Criminal Court [and e]ach court
has the authority to issue temporary or final orders of protection.” Molloy v. Molloy, 24
N.Y.S.3d 333, 336 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting People v. Wood, 742 N.E.2d 114, 116
(N.Y. 2000)).
85. KARIN V. RHODES, CATHERINE CERULLI, CATHERINE L. KOTHARI, MELISSA E. DICHTER
& STEVE MARCUS, VICTIM PARTICIPATION IN INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE PROSECUTION:
IMPLICATIONS FOR SAFETY 95 (2011), https://www.ojp.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/235284.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2RT-L7WK] (“[V]ictims whose abusive partners were under the influence
of drugs or alcohol at the time of the index event were more likely to want to proceed with
pressing charges (to hold the offender accountable and protect herself from further risk) and
less likely to express a wish to drop the charges.”).
86. These crimes included “disorderly conduct, harassment, menacing, reckless
endangerment, assault, attempted assault, or attempted murder.” Jaros, supra note 38, at
1454–55 n.57.
87. Id. at 1454.
88. Christopher R. Frank, Comment, Criminal Protection Orders in Domestic Violence
Cases: Getting Rid of Rats with Snakes, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 919, 922 (1996).
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punishing a perpetrator of IPV.89 In some states, the issuance of a criminal
order of protection is mandated.90 In other states, criminal orders of
protection are not mandated, but courts consider factors such as whether an
order of protection is “reasonably necessary to protect the alleged victim,
whe[ther] release without condition would be inimical to public safety,
whe[ther] the safety and protection of the petitioner may be impaired, and
whe[ther] there is possible danger or intimidation to the alleged victim or
another.”91
In New York, Criminal Procedure Law section 530.1292 authorizes a
criminal court to issue a criminal order of protection when an action
involving “any crime or violation between spouses, former spouses, parent
and child, or between members of the same family or household” is
pending.93 Courts may issue either a “limited” TOP or a “full” TOP.94 In
deciding whether to issue a criminal order of protection, the statute instructs
courts to consider a number of factors.95 These factors include access to
weapons; prior incidents of abuse; conduct subject to prior orders of
protection; past or present injury, threats, or substance abuse; and whether a
TOP will be effective in the absence of a certain condition (e.g., exclusion
from the home or a prohibition on contact).96
Since the statute describes factors that a court should consider97 but fails
to provide guidance on what a prosecutor must show or what evidentiary
standard the court should apply when deciding whether to issue a TOP, courts
rely on precedent.98 In People v. Forman,99 for example, the New York
County Criminal Court held that it must determine whether there is a “danger
of intimidation or injury” to the complainant, and that there must be a
“reasonable foundation” for that determination.100 The court also held that
the reasons for a decision should be evident from the record.101
89. See infra Part II.B.1.
90. See Suk, supra note 5, at 16–17 (citing statutes).
91. See Frank, supra note 88, at 928–29 (footnotes omitted).
92. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12 (McKinney 2022).
93. Id. § 530.12(1); see also The Comm. on Crim. Cts., Paper Shield: Order of Protection
in the New York City Criminal Court, 48 REC. ASS’N BAR CITY N.Y. 891, 891 (1993)
(“Statutory authority for the issuance of orders of protection in criminal cases has existed for
victims of family offenses since 1977 and for victims of crimes other than family offenses
since 1981.”).
94. A limited order of protection allows for contact between the parties but prohibits the
subject of the order from abusing, harassing, or threatening the alleged victim. See Resources
& Services Orders of Protection, NYPD, https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/services/victimservices/resources-services-orders-protection.page [https://perma.cc/MCW3-XJNF] (last
visited Sept. 2, 2022). A full order of protection prohibits all contact between the parties. See
id.
95. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 530.12(1)(a).
96. Id. Judges are permitted to consider other factors as well, as this list is not exhaustive.
Id.
97. Id.
98. See Frank, supra note 88, at 928–30.
99. 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Crim. Ct. 1989).
100. Id. at 763.
101. Id.
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In addition to the various factors that courts consider when deciding
whether to issue a TOP in a criminal case, courts must apply a standard of
proof.102 Courts disagree on the proper evidentiary standard to apply in cases
where a criminal order of protection is sought by the prosecutor as a condition
of bail.103 Most states have declined to apply an evidentiary standard of
“beyond a reasonable doubt,” which is the usual standard in criminal
proceedings.104 For example, in Forman, the court required “[r]easonable
factual support,” which is closer to the “preponderance of the evidence”
standard typical of most civil proceedings.105 But, as discussed in Part II.A,
an indeterminate standard puts parent defendants at risk of effectively losing
custody of their children and being barred from their homes.106
C. Crawford v. Ally
On June 24, 2021, the First Department considered a case in which a
criminal order of protection barred a parent defendant from her home and
effectively separated her from her children.107 This was an important
decision because it finally addressed a situation that has presented a
significant problem for so many IPV defendants in New York: the issuance
of a TOP that deprives the defendant of significant liberty and property
interests without an evidentiary hearing.108 Although Ms. Crawford’s TOP
was eventually modified and her criminal charges dismissed, the First
Department heard her appeal because the issue she faced was likely to recur
for other defendants.109 In a groundbreaking opinion, the First Department
ruled that the Bronx County Criminal Court should have held an evidentiary
hearing on whether a full stay-away order was necessary due to the
significant property and liberty interests at stake.110
1. Procedural History
On November 3, 2019, Ms. Crawford was arrested on a criminal complaint
charging third-degree assault, petit larceny, obstruction of breathing or blood
circulation, and second-degree harassment.111 The complaint alleged that
Crawford and two unnamed men acted “in concert” and “struck” Mayers with
102. See Frank, supra note 88, at 929.
103. See id. at 928–29.
104. See id. at 929–30.
105. See id. at 930 (comparing the Forman standard of “reasonable factual support” to the
civil standard “preponderance of the evidence”); Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 759 n.1. The court
in Forman expressly declined to decide whether a higher standard of proof might be
constitutionally required, although the answer to such a question is critical. See Frank, supra
note 88, at 930.
106. See infra Part II.A.
107. Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 717 (App. Div. 2021).
108. See id.
109. Id. (“[W]hile this proceeding is moot as to petitioner, it falls within the exception to
the mootness doctrine because it implicates substantial issues that will likely recur elsewhere
and that typically evade review . . . .”).
110. See id. at 717–18.
111. Id. at 714.
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“a closed fist and kicked him multiple times.”112 The complaint also stated
that one of the men had grabbed him by his neck and took his gold chain.113
The complaint did not, however, articulate any specific act of violence that
Crawford herself allegedly perpetrated against Mayers.114 Nonetheless,
Mayers signed a criminal complaint naming her as an assailant.115
At Ms. Crawford’s arraignment in Bronx County Criminal Court, the
prosecutors consented to her release but requested a full TOP.116 Judge
Jeffrey Rosenblueth granted this request.117 Ms. Crawford petitioned the
court for a limited TOP,118 but the court denied her request and issued a full
stay-away order.119 Because Mr. Mayers told the arresting officers that he
lived at Ms. Crawford’s address—despite the fact that he stayed there
intermittently and was not named on the lease—the court order prohibited
Ms. Crawford from entering her own home.120 The court did, however, grant
Ms. Crawford’s request that the order of protection be “subject to family
court modification.”121 In making an order subject to family court
modification, a criminal court acknowledges that it has temporarily imposed
a restriction on a parent’s right to association with their child and grants
another court the opportunity to alter the order if appropriate.122
On November 8, 2019, still in criminal court but this time before Judge
Ally, Ms. Crawford renewed her request for a limited TOP, arguing that Mr.
Mayers was not an authorized occupant of her apartment,123 and that the
order, in effect, had taken away her home and separated her from her
children.124 The order did not prevent Ms. Crawford from seeing her children
but did not specify how she would be able to see them, nor was there any
mention of visitation.125 The prosecutors requested that the TOP remain a
full TOP due to the nature of the charges and the visible injuries on Mr.
Mayers at the time of the arrest,126 but again failed to articulate Ms.
Crawford’s alleged role in the incident.127
In support of their application for the TOP to remain in full, the prosecutor
informed the court of an “extensive DIR [(domestic incident report)] history”
112. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 7.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 714.
117. See id.
118. See supra note 94 and accompanying text (describing difference between limited and
full TOPs).
119. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 714–15.
120. Id. at 714.
121. Id.
122. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1459.
123. Ms. Crawford’s lease addendum listed only herself, her brother, and her two children
as authorized occupants of the New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA) unit. Crawford,
150 N.Y.S.3d at 715.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9.
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between Ms. Crawford and Mr. Mayers.128 Notably, however, the prosecutor
failed to mention that the seventeen prior DIRs named Mr. Mayers as the
abuser and Ms. Crawford as the victim.129 The prosecutor did not provide
these reports to defense counsel or to the court, and Judge Ally failed to
request them or conduct a further inquiry.130 Had Judge Ally inquired
further, he would have discovered the prosecutor’s misleading representation
of the prior DIRs.
Ultimately, Judge Ally denied Ms. Crawford’s request for a limited
TOP131 and denied her request for a due process hearing that would have
required the prosecution to show that the full stay-away order was
necessary.132 A date to return to court was set for December 20, 2019.133
Prior to the December 20 hearing, Ms. Crawford again moved for a
modification of the full TOP.134 Ms. Crawford attached her lease addendum,
which included her family composition and listed herself, her brother, and
her two children as the only authorized occupants of her New York City
Housing Authority apartment, in order to show the court that she was in
danger of violating her lease.135 Ms. Crawford was in danger of losing her
apartment permanently because only authorized occupants were permitted to
reside in her subsidized apartment, and Mr. Mayers refused to leave.136
Nonetheless, Judge Ally denied the request, finding “no change of
circumstances,” and extended the full TOP until January 30, 2020.137
Prior to the January 30 hearing, Ms. Crawford sought a writ of mandamus
directing the Bronx County Criminal Court to hold a hearing on the scope
and appropriateness of the TOP issued in her case.138 At the next court
appearance, approximately two months after the court’s issuance of the full
stay-away order against Ms. Crawford on November 3, 2019, another
criminal court judge—Judge Audrey Stone—performed a more extensive
analysis of the prosecution’s request to extend the TOP and modified the
128. See id. A domestic incident report (DIR) is a report that law enforcement officers
create in response to a domestic violence incident. Frequently Asked Questions, NYPD,
https://www1.nyc.gov/site/nypd/services/victim-services/frequently-asked-questions.page
[https://perma.cc/E9P2-5AQ3] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022) (“A DIR is a report made by an
officer in response to a domestic violence incident. It includes a summary of the situation and
a victim’s statement about what happened.”).
129. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 10.
130. See id.
131. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 715 (reasoning that there was still a “remedy to see the
children” and to “gain[] access to the home”).
132. Id. (“The court further stated that unless petitioner was prepared to present additional
information as to the issuance of the TOP, it would remain in effect.”).
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. See id.
136. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 10–11. According to NYCHA protocol,
possession or use of an apartment by a person other than the tenant of record can be a ground
for termination. See id. at 32 (citing N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., NYCHA MANAGEMENT MANUAL
CH. IV: TERMINATION OF TENANCY 4 (2016)).
137. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 715.
138. When the criminal case was later dismissed, the petition for writ of mandamus was
dismissed as moot. Id. at 716.
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TOP after considering several factors.139 The court concluded that, under
Criminal Procedure Law section 530.12(1)(a), “it would not be appropriate
to require [petitioner] to stay away from the home, school, business or place
of employment of the individual whom she has children in common with.”140
The court then modified the order of protection, requiring Ms. Crawford only
to “refrain from any act that would create an unreasonable risk to the health,
safety, and welfare of any family member and in particular . . . not to engage
in any family offences against the complainant.”141 In making this decision,
Judge Stone did not hear any witnesses or place any particular burden on the
prosecution. The case was adjourned until March 5, 2020, at which time the
case was dismissed upon application by the prosecution.142
2. The First Department’s Decision
In order to deprive a defendant of significant liberty or property interests,
there must be an articulated reasonable basis for doing so.143 Before
Crawford, there was no precedent explicitly allowing defendants to request
a hearing when they opposed the prosecutor’s request for a TOP. Indeed,
Judge Stone stated that it was not the Bronx County Criminal Court’s practice
to hold such a hearing.144
On appeal, the First Department concluded that when a defendant faces
the risk of such deprivation, the court should conduct a “prompt evidentiary
hearing” that enables the judge to ascertain whether the order of protection
should be issued.145 Even though Ms. Crawford’s case had already been
dismissed, and the issue was moot as to her, the First Department found an

139. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 17.
[I]t is in the court’s view that there has been no prior order of protection issued
against the defendant [(Ms. Crawford)] here. There ha[ve] been many prior
incidents of abuse against the defendant that were perpetrated by the complainant.
As to past and present injury, there were photos demonstrated to the court relating
to injuries that the complainant in this case had. However, th[ere] was nothing of
any specificity indicating that the defendant was in fact responsible for those
injuries. As to threats, drug or alcohol abuse and access to weapons, I have not
heard that defendant has made any threat, that the defendant has a drug or alcohol
issue, or that the defendant has access to any weapons. In fact, the record that was
made today before the court is that the complainant has threatened this defendant,
that the complainant has an alcohol intoxication issue. And in fact, that whatever
mention that there was of weapons seem[s] to have not been corroborated when the
People discussed whether or not there was actually a weapon at the time of the
writing of this complaint.
Id.
140. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 716.
141. Id.
142. Id. Upon the dismissal of a criminal case, any TOPs issued in conjunction with that
case, unless otherwise stated, are no longer valid. See Ko, supra note 11, at 364.
143. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 717.
144. Id. at 716 (“The District Attorney’s Office conceded that temporary orders of
protection are ‘regularly’ issued in domestic abuse cases in the Bronx . . . .”).
145. Id.
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exception to the mootness doctrine,146 noting that this issue was “likely to
recur ‘among other members of the public.’”147
In ruling that the Bronx County Criminal Court should have held a hearing
on whether a TOP was necessary, the First Department found that Ms.
Crawford being barred from her home—even temporarily—had
“far-reaching” consequences.148 Where a defendant is deprived of a valuable
property right to a lease or tenancy by a criminal order of protection, as was
the case here, the defendant is entitled to the protections of due process.149
Moreover, the court noted that Ms. Crawford was barred from access to her
children for almost three months and held that this was a violation of her due
process rights.150 In In re F.W.,151 the First Department held that a parent is
entitled to a prompt hearing on a determination to remove their children from
the parent’s physical custody, in accordance with the parent’s and children’s
rights to due process.152 Although In re F.W. involved a family court’s
decision to remove a child from their parent, the fundamental liberty interest
at stake—a parent’s interest in the care, custody, and control of their
children—was the same in both cases and thus required the protections of
procedural due process.153
Although the order in Crawford did not explicitly remove Ms. Crawford’s
children from her custody, it had the same effect. In In re F.W., the court
found that the delay in holding an expedited evidentiary hearing interfered
with the petitioner father’s fundamental liberty interest in the care, custody,
and control of his children and violated his due process rights. Similarly, the
Crawford court held that Judge Ally’s refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing
on the necessity of the full TOP violated Ms. Crawford’s due process rights
because, as with the father in In re F.W., the lack of a hearing interfered with
Ms. Crawford’s fundamental liberty interest in seeing her children.154

146. An exception to the mootness doctrine exists where “(1) [there is] likelihood of
repetition, either between the parties or among other members of the public; (2) [it involves]
a phenomenon typically evading review; and (3) [there is] a showing of significant or
important questions not previously passed on, i.e., substantial and novel issues.” Id. (quoting
Hearst Corp. v. Clyne, 409 N.E.2d 876, 878 (N.Y. 1980)).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 717.
149. See id.
150. See id. (citing In re F.W., 122 N.Y.S.3d 620 (App. Div. 2020)). The court also
referenced a decision from Nassau County Supreme Court, in which a full evidentiary hearing
was deemed permissible but not mandatory. See Lopez v. Fischer, No. 17025/09, 2009 N.Y.
Misc. LEXIS 5612, at *6–7 (Sup. Ct. Dec. 2, 2009).
151. 122 N.Y.S.3d 620 (App. Div. 2020).
152. Id. at 622. Although this Note focuses on a parent defendant’s right to due process,
the New York Court of Appeals has also recognized that children have a parallel “right to be
reared by [their] parent.” Id. at 623 (quoting Bennett v. Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277, 281 (N.Y.
1976)).
153. See id.
154. See Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 717.
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II. THE ISSUANCE OF CRIMINAL ORDERS OF PROTECTION AGAINST
PARENT DEFENDANTS IN CASES OF IPV
Although criminal orders of protection have alleviated some of the
difficulties155 associated with prosecuting cases of IPV and have provided
immediate protection for victims, they have also posed a significant
challenge to parent defendants accused of IPV.156 Part II.A will examine the
rights that are at stake in criminal proceedings for alleged perpetrators of IPV.
Part II.B will then discuss the value of criminal orders of protection.
Part II.C will evaluate the impact of the Crawford decision in New York
criminal courts.
A. The Need to Protect a Parent Defendant’s Rights
In determining whether to issue a temporary order of protection, courts
must balance the state’s interest in protecting victims of IPV with the
defendant’s substantive and procedural due process rights. Courts encounter
a particularly difficult problem when a parent defendant lives and co-parents
with their accuser.157
1. The Fundamental Right to Parent
The U.S. Supreme Court has long recognized a parent’s fundamental right
to parent.158 Courts view the family as an autonomous unit free from state
interference, with parents permitted to direct their children’s lives as they see
fit.159 This includes matters such as a parent’s right to direct the upbringing
and education of their children.160 For example, the state cannot dictate
whether parents send their children to public or private schools.161 Parents
also have a constitutional right to decide whether a third party, such as a
grandparent, may visit with their children.162 As the Court has held, “[i]t is

155. See infra Part II.B.
156. If a parent defendant lives with their accuser, a full stay-away criminal order of
protection excludes them from their shared home and effectively separates them from their
children. See Newman, supra note 7.
157. Some scholars have addressed this problem in the context of endangering the welfare
of a child. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1447. These criminal protection orders prohibit the
parent defendant from having any contact with their child and warrant a hearing to determine
whether the temporary removal of custody is reasonable. See id.
158. See Marianne E. Scott, Parent-Child Testimonial Privilege: Preserving and
Protecting the Fundamental Right to Family Privacy, 52 U. CIN. L. REV. 901, 906 (1983); see
also Moore v. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 494–95 (1977) (plurality opinion) (finding that the
U.S. Constitution protects the sanctity of the family precisely because the institution of the
family is deeply rooted in this country’s history and tradition).
159. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923) (holding that a state statute
prohibiting foreign language instruction at school was impermissible state interference with
the autonomous family unit).
160. Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925) (striking down state statute
requiring parents to enroll children in public school).
161. See id. at 535.
162. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 61–63 (2000) (finding that parents have the right to
limit visitation of their children by third parties).
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cardinal with us that the custody, care and nurture of the child reside first in
the parents, whose primary function and freedom include preparation for
obligations the state can neither supply nor hinder.”163 However, this right
is not absolute: a state can intervene if the parents’ actions constitute harm
to the child.164 Absent a showing of harm, the state cannot intervene in this
sacrosanct relationship.165 This principle has also been recognized by New
York state courts.166
But it is important to recognize that this fundamental right is not just about
a parent being able to decide where the child will go to school or what
languages the child will learn; it is also about a parent’s right to the
companionship and custody of their child.167 This is particularly relevant in
cases in which the state seeks to remove a child from a parent’s custody.
Indeed, an order of protection that bars a parent from contacting their child
is tantamount to an order of removal, requiring the same constitutional
protections.168 In Stanley v. Illinois,169 the Supreme Court protected a
parent’s right to the custody and care of their children in part because of a
longstanding belief in family privacy.170 In that case, the Court considered
a challenge from an unmarried father whose children became wards of the
state upon the death of their mother.171 The Court found that a presumption
that unmarried fathers are unsuitable as parents violates due process since
parental unfitness must be determined on the basis of individualized proof.172
As such, it was unconstitutional for the state to remove Mr. Stanley’s children
from his custody without evidence to suggest that he was unfit to be a
parent.173
New York courts take a parent’s right to the custody of their child just as
seriously.174 In In re F.W., the First Department recognized both a “parent’s
private interest in having custody of his or her children” and “the children’s
private interest in residing with their parent . . . .”175 Moreover, the fact that
parents have not been “model parents” or have lost temporary custody of
their child does not eliminate the “fundamental liberty interest of natural
163. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).
164. See id. at 166–67.
165. See id.
166. See In re F.W., 122 N.Y.S.3d 620, 623 (App. Div. 2020) (“[A] parent’s interest ‘in
the care, custody, and control of their children . . . is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental
liberty interests.’” (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000))).
167. See Scott, supra note 158, at 907.
168. See In re Elizabeth C., 66 N.Y.S. 3d 300, 311–12 (App. Div. 2017) (holding that a
TOP against a parent on behalf of a child constitutes a legal removal triggering the same due
process rights as if the child were physically removed from the family home).
169. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
170. See id. at 651 (“The private interest here, that of a man in the children he has sired and
raised, undeniably warrants deference and, absent a powerful countervailing interest,
protection.”).
171. Id. at 646.
172. Id. at 649.
173. See id.
174. See In re F.W., 122 N.Y.S.3d 620, 623 (App. Div. 2020).
175. Id. at 624.
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parents in the care, custody, and management of their child . . . .”176 When
an order of protection prohibits contact between a parent and a child, due
process requires that the parent be allowed to challenge the removal through
a prompt hearing.177 In In re F.W., the court emphasized that the time before
“a post-deprivation hearing ‘should be measured in hours and days, not
weeks and months.’”178 Additionally, the evidentiary standard at these
hearings is clear: “[T]he Family Court must find[] that removal is necessary
to avoid imminent risk [to the child].”179
Thus, given the fundamental nature of the parent-child relationship, certain
procedural and evidentiary requirements must be satisfied before the state
can separate a parent from their child.180
2. Procedural Due Process
Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution,181 parents are entitled to a hearing on their fitness as a parent
before the state can remove their children from their care and custody.182 The
due process clause of the New York State Constitution provides that “no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.”183 Following the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Mathews v.
Eldridge,184 which set forth a three-part balancing test for evaluating due
process challenges in federal criminal proceedings,185 the New York Court
of Appeals held that due process challenges in state criminal proceedings

176. Id.
177. See In re Elizabeth C., 66 N.Y.S. 3d 300, 311–12 (App. Div. 2017) (extending the
requirement for a prompt hearing to situations in which parent and child are prohibited from
daily interaction).
178. In re F.W., 122 N.Y.S. 3d at 624. Although these hearings are supposed to be prompt,
they frequently take three or more months to complete. See generally THE BRONX DEFS.,
PROTRACTED 1028 HEARINGS: FIVE CASE STUDIES RAISING STATUTORY AND CONSTITUTIONAL
CONCERNS ABOUT NON-EXPEDITED HEARINGS UNDER SECTION 1028 OF THE FAMILY COURT
ACT, https://www.bronxdefenders.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Bronx-Protracted-1028Hearings.pdf [https://perma.cc/4YVA-M2XF].
179. Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 848 (N.Y. 2004) (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also In re Kevin W., 144 N.Y.S.3d 563, 564 (App. Div. 2021) (“Accordingly,
the applicable standard was whether the relief sought by ACS—a temporary order of
protection on behalf of the child—was necessary to eliminate an ‘imminent risk’ to the child’s
life or health.”). These due process protections—the requirement of a prompt hearing
following removal and a high evidentiary standard—were codified by the New York State
Legislature into sections 1027 and 1028 of the Family Court Act. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§§ 1027–1028 (McKinney 2022).
180. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972); see also In re Marie B., 465 N.E.2d
807, 810 (N.Y. 1984) (“Fundamental constitutional principles of due process and protected
privacy prohibit governmental interference with the liberty of a parent to supervise and rear a
child except upon a showing of overriding necessity.”).
181. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
182. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 649 (invalidating state statute that automatically declared children
of unmarried fathers to be wards of the state upon the death of the mother).
183. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6.
184. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
185. Id. at 335.
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should be evaluated under the same test.186 According to the standard in
Mathews, courts must carefully balance: (1) the private interest that will be
affected by the official government action; (2) the risk of an erroneous
deprivation of such interest through the procedures used and the probable
value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and (3) the
government’s interest in the action.187 A due process hearing must be
provided at a “meaningful time and in a meaningful manner,”188 but the
requirements of due process are flexible and evaluated on a case-by-case
basis.189
In People v. Forman,190 the New York County Criminal Court applied the
Mathews test to evaluate the adequacy of the procedures afforded to Mr.
Forman prior to depriving him of significant property interests.191 The court
found that the defendant’s private interest—the use and enjoyment of his
home and his property interest in the joint ownership of his residence with
his wife—would be substantially affected by a TOP excluding him from the
home.192 The court also found that there was a risk of error in temporarily
excluding the defendant from his home.193
Applying the third factor of the Mathews test, the court found that the
state’s interest in issuing TOPs pursuant to Criminal Procedure Law section
530.12 was significant.194 The court recognized domestic violence as a
“social scourge of the first order” and, given the danger of injury or
intimidation, found that excluding the accused individual from the home is
essential to the maintenance of criminal prosecution.195 On balance, after
carefully considering all three factors, the court found that the emergency
nature of the decision and the practical difficulties inherent in holding an
immediate evidentiary hearing “mitigate against the imposition of such
hearings as constitutionally required before a TOP may first be issued at
arraignment.”196
The Mathews test can similarly be applied to Ms. Crawford’s case to
determine whether she was afforded adequate due process. Considering the
first Mathews factor, the criminal order of protection deprived Ms. Crawford
of significant property and liberty interests.197 The order forced Ms.
186. See People v. Ramos, 651 N.E.2d 895, 899 (N.Y. 1995) (applying Mathews balancing
test to evaluate need for additional process).
187. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 321.
188. Id. at 333.
189. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) (describing due process as a
flexible standard).
190. 546 N.Y.S.2d 755 (Crim. Ct. 1989).
191. See id. at 763.
192. Id. at 764.
193. Id. at 765.
194. Id. at 764.
195. Id. (“Not only does the State have a strong interest in combatting domestic violence
through criminal prosecutions, but that interest is severely undermined if victims of domestic
violence are too frightened by further threats and acts of violence to participate in the criminal
prosecution of their cases.”).
196. Id. at 765.
197. See Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 717 (App. Div. 2021).
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Crawford to vacate her own home and stop associating with the father of her
children.198 This deprivation posed an enormous risk to Ms. Crawford, since
she was the only adult authorized to live in the apartment.199 With Mr.
Mayers—an unauthorized occupant—residing there and refusing to leave,
Ms. Crawford was in danger of losing her apartment permanently.200 Judge
Ally, however, remarked that he was “not going to dive so much into the
property rights in this case.”201 He also added that the risk that Ms. Crawford
could lose her public housing apartment is “another layer of concern for [Ms.
Crawford], not for this Court.”202
The TOP against Ms. Crawford also interfered with her fundamental right
to parent her children. Because Ms. Crawford resided in her apartment with
her two young children, the order of protection—which prevented her from
returning home—effectively separated her from her children for almost three
months.203 This separation constitutes a substantial deprivation204 and is
devastating both for the parent and for the child.205 For parents, separation
from their child can induce feelings of anguish, despair, guilt, blame, and
depression.206 Without an evidentiary hearing to substantiate the risk of
harm that Ms. Crawford allegedly posed to Mr. Mayers, Ms. Crawford was
at serious risk of an “erroneous deprivation.”207
Finally, the government has an interest in issuing orders of protection in
criminal cases to provide victims of IPV with immediate protection from
their alleged abusers.208 However, a thorough inquiry or evidentiary hearing
in this case would have revealed that Ms. Crawford did not pose an
immediate threat to Mr. Mayers’s safety. In fact, the criminal complaint in
this case did not allege that Ms. Crawford perpetrated any act of physical
violence against Mr. Mayers.209 Moreover, Judge Ally failed to make any
factual findings that Ms. Crawford had harmed Mr. Mayers or posed a threat

198. See id.
199. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 10–11.
200. Id. at 32 (citing N.Y.C. HOUS. AUTH., NYCHA MANAGEMENT MANUAL CH. IV:
TERMINATION OF TENANCY 4 (2016)). Despite being made aware of the gravity of this
situation—Ms. Crawford losing an apartment that she had called home for over five years—
Judge Ally refused to address it. Id. at 11.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. See Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 717.
204. See In re F.W., 122 N.Y.S.3d 620, 623–24 (App. Div. 2020) (holding parent-child
separation constitutes substantial deprivation triggering due process inquiry).
205. See Melissa De Witte, Separation from Parents Removes Children’s Most Important
Protection and Generates a New Trauma, Stanford Scholar Says, STAN. NEWS (June 26,
2018), https://news.stanford.edu/2018/06/26/psychological-impact-early-life-stress-parentalseparation/ [https://perma.cc/PE6S-HY55]; see also infra Part II.B.3.
206. See De Witte, supra note 205.
207. People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 763–65 (Crim. Ct. 1989) (discussing the second
balancing factor of the Mathews test).
208. See id. at 764.
209. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 7 (“The complaint . . . [alleged that] Ms.
Crawford and two unnamed men were ‘acting in concert’ in that ‘they’ struck him with ‘a’
closed fist and kicked him multiple times.”).
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to his safety.210 Here, an application of the Mathews test would have
revealed that a full stay-away order depriving Ms. Crawford of significant
property and fundamental rights was not justified by the governmental
interest in protecting Mr. Mayers from any alleged harm. Thus, the
government’s objectives of providing immediate safety would not have been
furthered under a careful application of the Mathews balancing test.211
Some may argue that procedures intended to restore custody—such as
going to family court in order to modify a TOP—mitigate the harm posed by
separation without adequate process.212 However, the Supreme Court
rejected this proposition in Stanley, noting that it has not “embraced the
general proposition that a wrong may be done if it can be undone.”213
Children endure significant harm when separated from their parents,214 and
there is often delay when trying to undo an order stripping a parent of
custody.215
B. The Value of Criminal Orders of Protection
Despite the shortcomings of criminal orders of protection, they are a
necessary and important component of the legal system’s response to IPV.
Many situations involving allegations of IPV are extremely dangerous, and a
criminal order of protection may be the only immediate way for a victim to
feel safe.216
When evaluating whether to issue an order of protection, criminal court
judges consider the practical and political ramifications217 of not granting a
TOP.218 For many judges, declining to issue an order of protection is
perceived as extremely risky.219 Judges often feel pressure to grant
prosecutors’ requests for protective orders, likely viewing prosecutors as
more familiar with the facts and better able to assess the possible level of
danger.220 So long as judges are thoughtful and engage in a thorough inquiry

210. See id. at 11.
211. See Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 717 (App. Div. 2021).
212. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1460.
213. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972).
214. See infra Part II.B.3.
215. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1460.
216. See Ko, supra note 11, at 367.
217. In New York City, criminal court judges are appointed to the bench for a ten-year term
by the mayor. See THE ASSOC. OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y., HOW TO BECOME A JUDGE 6
(2018), https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/become_a_judge.pdf [https://perma.cc/N9UEWNA2]. Because judges are not appointed for life, criminal court judges may feel pressure
to issue orders of protection and to not appear soft on crimes involving IPV.
218. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1458.
219. See id.; see also Judy Harris Kluger, Independence Under Siege: Unbridled Criticism
of Judges and Prosecutors, 5 J.L. & POL’Y 535, 536–37 (1997) (“If a defendant commits a
new crime while released on bail, the judge who set the bail is often criticized, and the critics
ignore any discussion of New York State law which prohibits preventative detention.”).
220. See David H. Taylor, Maria V. Stoilkov & Daniel J. Greco, Ex Parte Domestic
Violence Orders of Protection: How Easing Access to Judicial Process Has Eased the
Possibility for Abuse of the Process, 18 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83, 92 (2008) (“No judge
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of the facts of each case when determining whether to issue a TOP, criminal
orders of protection have the potential to do much more good than harm.221
In light of the potential difficulties associated with obtaining a conviction
against a defendant in a case of IPV,222 issuing criminal orders of protection
may be an even more important legal response.223 Although IPV between
parents has an enormous impact on children, a solution that removes the child
from the home cannot be the best option.224 Thus, on balance, criminal
orders of protection are a sufficient compromise even though they, too, raise
issues.
1. Issues Impairing the Prosecution of IPV
Cases involving IPV are notoriously difficult for prosecutors.225 “Scholars
have posited a number of theories for the low rate of prosecution” in IPV
cases, including prosecutors’ doubts that the crimes were serious enough,
provable, and of interest to the judges who would be hearing the cases.226 In
cases involving IPV, victims are typically unwilling, often due to fear, to
cooperate with the prosecution.227 The process of testifying can also
re-traumatize228 a victim of IPV.229 Entering the court system can be
intimidating and difficult for any person, and this is especially true in IPV
cases, where having to face an abuser in court can be as painful and damaging
to the victim as the crime itself.230 The effect of re-traumatization is even
more pronounced for individuals from “already disadvantaged, vulnerable,
or marginalized populations.”231
A witness’s refusal to testify presents a problem for prosecutors, because
a witness’s out-of-court statement is considered testimonial and cannot be
introduced at trial in the witness’s absence, unless the defendant previously

wants to deny an order of protection to a person who is later injured or killed by the person
against whom they unsuccessfully sought relief.”).
221. See supra Part II.A.
222. See infra Part II.B.1.
223. See Suk, supra note 5, at 18–19.
224. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 849 (N.Y. 2004).
225. See Suk, supra note 5, at 18.
226. GOODMARK, supra note 65, at 110.
227. See Suk, supra note 5, at 18 n.52 (noting that after filing a criminal complaint,
80 percent of IPV victims recant their statements or refuse to cooperate with the prosecution).
228. See Negar Katirai, Retraumatized in Court, 62 ARIZ. L. REV. 81, 88 (2020)
(“Retraumatization, also known as secondary victimization, describes the experience of
survivors who encounter ‘victim-blaming attitudes, behaviors, and practices’ from service
providers and institutions ‘which result in additional trauma.’” (quoting Rebecca Campbell,
What Really Happened?: A Validation Study of Rape Survivors’ Help-Seeking Experiences
with the Legal and Medical Systems, 20 VIOLENCE & VICTIMS 55, 56 (2005))).
229. See id. at 85 (“[F]acing one’s abuser in a courtroom . . . can provide the abuser with
an additional opportunity to exert power and control over the victim.”).
230. See id. at 84–85.
231. See id. at 85 (citing 20 Facts About U.S. Inequality That Everyone Should Know,
STAN. CTR. ON POVERTY & INEQ. (2011), https://inequality.stanford.edu/publications/20-factsabout-us-inequality-everyone-should-know [https://perma.cc/A823-PAXR]).
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had the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.232 Thus, if a victim refuses
to testify, the prosecutor cannot bring other witnesses to the stand to repeat
what the victim previously said.233 In a case where the victim refuses to
testify at trial, the prosecutor may be unable to pursue the case further, since
much evidence will be barred from admission.234
Given the noted challenges of prosecuting cases involving IPV, issuing
orders of protection in conjunction with an ongoing criminal case can be
more efficient and effective at punishing a perpetrator of IPV.235 By issuing
a criminal protective order at the arraignment stage of a criminal case,236
courts provide victims with immediate protection and the recognition that
their situation is being taken seriously.
2. Safety Concerns
In New York City, 44 percent of women killed are killed by their intimate
partners.237 For police officers, domestic violence calls are some of the most
dangerous situations because “emotions are running high” and “behavior can
be unpredictable.”238 These calls are also the most frequent and take up
one-third of all police time.239
Given the risk of serious injury or death, many scholars argue that an
immediate criminal order of protection in such cases is often the safest
measure for combating IPV.240 Courts have found that the state has a
profound interest in protecting a victim from IPV.241 IPV also has a
“significant economic impact.”242 The risk of violence and intimidation is
232. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 53–54 (2004); see also Suk, supra note 5,
at 18. A victim’s statements during a 911 call, however, where the primary purpose was to
enable police assistance in an ongoing emergency, are not considered testimonial. Davis v.
Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827–28 (2006).
233. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
234. See Suk, supra note 5, at 47 (discussing that the “vast majority of cases do not proceed
to trial or result in conviction” because proving cases of IPV “beyond a reasonable doubt may
be difficult without the victim’s participation”).
235. See id. at 18–19.
236. See id. at 48.
237. See Intimate Partner Violence (IPV), supra note 29.
238. Samantha Solomon, Domestic Violence Poses a Danger to All, Including Responding
Police Officers. What Can Be Done to Break the Cycle?, ABC10 (June 1, 2021, 3:28 PM),
https://www.abc10.com/article/news/local/domestic-violence-911-calls-police-officers/103b5f49694-bc7b-4902-8205-a7b1b4e9fe6b [https://perma.cc/FLV8-RBSX].
239. See Ko, supra note 11, at 361 (citing Joan Zorza, Woman Battering: High Costs and
the State of the Law, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 383, 385 (1994)).
240. See Frank, supra note 88, at 923–25, 924 n.22 (citing Developments in the Law: Legal
Responses to Domestic Violence, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1498, 1523–24 (1993)).
241. See, e.g., People v. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 764–65 (Crim. Ct. 1989) (“Domestic
violence has come to be recognized as a social scourge of the first order. Not only does the
State have a strong interest in combatting domestic violence through criminal prosecutions,
but that interest is severely undermined if victims of domestic violence are too frightened by
further threats and acts of violence to participate in the criminal prosecution of their cases.”
(citations omitted)).
242. See Ko, supra note 11, at 361 (describing effect of IPV on absenteeism and
productivity in the workplace leading to loss of up to thirteen billion dollars to employers
annually).
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greater in cases in which the victim and the perpetrator of IPV continue to
live under the same roof.243 Further, where there is a danger of injury to, or
intimidation of, the victim, a TOP that excludes the accused from the home
may be crucial.244 Thus, “the state has an interest in issuing the TOP at the
earliest possible time, since the danger of intimidation and injury to the
complainant, if it exists, is an immediate one.”245
Issuing a TOP in an IPV case is an emergency decision.246 Thus, due to
the inherent safety concerns and the need for expediency, many courts err on
the side of caution when issuing TOPs because of a fear that failure to do so
will result in serious injury or death.247
3. What About the Children?
The correct legal response to situations involving IPV is not clear.
Although orders of protection provide victims with immediate protection,
courts often issue them as a procedural default248—a practice that can have
other harmful effects.249 Such effects include homelessness, parent-child
separation, and negative immigration consequences.250 Cases of IPV are
further complicated when there are children involved.
In general, the law assumes it is better for children to maintain an ongoing
relationship with their parents. This right to associate with one’s child does
not turn on whether the relationship between the parent and child is
necessarily good or healthy; a state can intervene in a parent-child
relationship only when the child needs protection from harm.251 Even when
parents are referred to the child welfare system for allegations of abuse or
neglect, courts must grant reasonable visitation with the child who has been
temporarily removed.252 A denial of visitation to a noncustodial parent is
considered a severe remedy, available only where there are compelling
reasons that such visitation would be harmful to the child.253
Children who are separated from their parents suffer harm.254 Children,
especially young children, rely on and need their parents for their emotional
243. Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d at 764 (describing danger as “self-evident”).
244. See id. at 764–65.
245. Id.
246. As such, notwithstanding the constitutional interests of a defendant, the exigent
circumstances and the logistics of holding a full and immediate hearing militate against
holding that the Constitution requires such hearings before issuing a TOP. See id.
247. See Jaros, supra note 38, at 1458.
248. See id. at 1450.
249. See Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 21, at 3–4.
250. See id.
251. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 168–69 (1944).
252. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1030 (McKinney 2022).
253. See Sheavlier v. Melendrez, 744 N.Y.S.2d 264, 266 (App. Div. 2002).
254. See In re F.W., 122 N.Y.S.3d 620, 624 (App. Div. 2020) (describing the “significant
emotional harm” children experience when temporarily separated from their parents (citing
Vivek S. Sankaran, Out of State and Out of Luck: The Treatment of Non-Custodial Parents
Under the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, 25 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 63,
64 n.7 (2006))).
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well-being.255 Clinical research has found that children who are separated
from their parents experience feelings of abandonment, rejection,
helplessness, and guilt.256 When children are separated from their parents,
their bodies produce a biological response known as “toxic stress.”257 Toxic
stress results in elevated stress hormones that can negatively affect memory,
behavior, and ability to focus.258 Over time, a child who experiences toxic
stress may be at an increased risk for diabetes, heart disease, depression, and
other chronic illnesses as an adult.259
The law attempts to balance the impact of the toxic stress arising from
parent-child separation with the long-term consequences of childhood
exposure to IPV. Children who are exposed to IPV are more likely to become
perpetrators of IPV themselves.260 Exposure to IPV teaches a child
dangerous lessons: (1) that it is okay to be physically violent toward someone
you love; (2) that if you are frustrated or do not get your way, it is okay to
respond with violence; and (3) that those who love you are also those who
hit you.261 Additionally, children who witness IPV in the home often have
emotional problems and trouble socializing.262
Historically, in order to address the impact that witnessing IPV can have
on a child, the New York City Administration for Children’s Services (ACS)
treated mothers who were victims of IPV—but had perpetrated no violence
themselves—as guilty of neglect and removed their children from the
home.263 In 2001, a group of mothers filed a class action in federal district
court alleging that their constitutional right to parent and to due process had
been violated by ACS’s policy.264 After the issuance of a preliminary
injunction by the late Judge Jack B. Weinstein and an appeal, the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit certified three questions to the New York
Court of Appeals.265 In a seminal opinion by Chief Judge Judith Kaye, New
York’s highest court held that in scenarios in which the sole grounds for

255. See De Witte, supra note 205.
256. See AM. BAR ASS’N, TRAUMA CAUSED BY SEPARATION OF CHILDREN FROM PARENTS:
A TOOL TO HELP LAWYERS 20 (2020) (citing Rosalind D. Folman, “I Was Tooken”: How
Children Experience Removal from Their Parents Preliminary to Placement into Foster
Care, 2 ADOPTION Q., no. 2, 1998, at 7), https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/
publications/litigation_committees/childrights/child-separation-memo/parent-childseparation-trauma-memo.pdf [https://perma.cc/AR9D-FZZC].
257. See Jack P. Shonkoff, Toxic Stress: Issue Brief on Family Separation and Child
Detention, IMMIGR. INITIATIVE HARV., Oct. 2019, at 1, 1, https://immigrationinitiative.
harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/10/brief_1_english.pdf
[https://perma.cc/68ESQ7QG].
258. Id. at 2.
259. See id.
260. See WEISBERG, supra note 34, at 311.
261. See id. at 312.
262. See Ko, supra note 11, at 362.
263. See Nicholson v. Scoppetta, 820 N.E.2d 840, 842–43 (N.Y. 2004).
264. In re Nicholson, 181 F. Supp. 2d 182, 183 (E.D.N.Y. 2001), modified sub nom.
Nicholson v. Williams, 294 F. Supp. 2d 369 (E.D.N.Y. 2003).
265. See Justine A. Dunlap, Judging Nicholson: An Assessment of Nicholson v. Scoppetta,
82 DENV. U. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (2005).
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removal of a child are based on witnessing IPV, such “removal may do more
harm to the child than good.”266
At face value, it is seemingly better to remove an abusive parent living in
a shared household through a criminal order of protection than to remove and
place a child in foster care. Although the effects of parent-child separation
are well documented, it is also harmful for a child to remain in the home with
an abusive parent.267 When properly implemented, a criminal order of
protection is an important remedy that allows children to remain in the home
and avoid foster care. However, these orders may go too far and
unnecessarily remove a parent from the home if they are issued as a
procedural default without a clear and thorough inquiry.268 In Ms.
Crawford’s case, although her children were not removed and placed in foster
care, she was the victim of a hastily-granted, full stay-away order that
separated her from her children without evidence that she, in fact, posed a
danger to their father.269
In one case, a woman identified as F.Z. and her partner shared an apartment
with their child and had no prior history of DIRs.270 After getting into an
argument, F.Z. called the police.271 Despite being told that neither party
wished to press charges, the police arrested both parties.272 As is customary
in New York criminal courts,273 at arraignment, the court issued a TOP
barring the parents from communicating.274 As a result, the couple was
unable to coordinate childcare, the child remained in their shared apartment
occupied by F.Z., and F.Z. was “thrust” into caring for and being the sole
provider for their child for the duration of the criminal case.275 Ultimately,
the prosecution dismissed the charges after two months because it could not
prove the case beyond a reasonable doubt.276
In another case, a man identified as B.P. was separated from his child for
months due to a stay-away order of protection issued in conjunction with his
prosecution. B.P. was the subject of a misdemeanor charge that was based
on a complaint arising from allegations by B.P.’s soon-to-be-separated wife
that he had threatened her with a gun.277 Even though the court made the
TOP subject to family court modification, B.P. was unable to modify the TOP

266. Nicholson, 820 N.E.2d at 849.
267. See Ko, supra note 11, at 362.
268. See generally Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 21, at 8–29 (describing impact of hastily issued criminal
orders of protection on various individuals).
269. See Newman, supra note 7.
270. Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 21, at 18.
271. Id.
272. Id.
273. See id. at 3; see also Jaros, supra note 38, at 1450.
274. See Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 21, at 19.
275. See id.
276. Id.
277. Id. at 19–20.
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in family court due to the COVID-19 pandemic.278 The TOP stayed in effect
even after B.P.’s wife recanted one month later and stated that she herself
committed crimes against B.P.’s family.279
Notwithstanding these
disclosures, the TOP remained in place for a total of eight months, after
which the case was dismissed.280
All three of these cases illustrate that a full TOP issued in conjunction with
a criminal case has severe consequences for parent defendants. In B.P.’s
case, the prosecution refused to dismiss the case or, at the very least, modify
the stay-away order even after the complainant recanted and implicated
herself in a crime.281 In F.Z.’s case, because of a court order, one parent
defendant was thrust into having sole custody of the minor child, and the
other parent defendant was barred from caring for that child without a
determination that he was unfit.282 Finally, Ms. Crawford was separated
from her children for months even though the prosecution produced no
evidence that she posed any danger to Mr. Mayers.283 These cases show how
the decision in Crawford—finding that the lack of an evidentiary hearing on
the necessity of the separation violated Ms. Crawford’s due process rights—
marks a huge step toward protecting the rights of defendants accused of IPV.
Although some may argue that Ms. Crawford could have sought a
modification of the full order of protection in family court, this was not an
adequate solution.284 Scholars have identified problems with making a TOP
subject to family court modification, suggesting that it does little to protect a
parent’s constitutional right to the custody and care of their child.285 For
parent defendants who do not have an active case in family court, seeking a
modification of the criminal order in family court could attract unwanted
attention from ACS.286 Thus, some parents are often counseled by their
attorneys not to seek a modification in family court.287

278. See id. at 20 (“Because of the pandemic, family court was not available to modify
orders of protection that separated families, like B.P. and his son.”); see also infra note 285
and accompanying text (explaining the inadequacy of making a criminal order of protection
subject to family court modification).
279. Brief of Brooklyn Def. Servs., et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner-Appellant, supra note 21, at 20.
280. Id.
281. See id. at 20.
282. See id. at 18–19; see also supra Parts II.A.1–2.
283. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 13.
284. This Note focuses on the effect of parent-child separation due to a temporary order of
protection issued by a criminal court. However, it is important to recognize that family court
would not have been able to modify the order to permit Ms. Crawford back in her home. The
family court would have only been able to address issues of custody and visitation, leaving
Ms. Crawford’s exclusion wholly unaddressed.
285. See Jaros, supra note 38 at 1459–60 (discussing issues such as an increased probability
that criminal court judges will issue orders of protection in the first place, the possibility of
flipping the burden of proof on the defendant, and the lack of a guarantee that the protective
order will ever come before a family court judge to be modified).
286. Video Interview with Eli Northrup, Pol’y Couns., the Bronx Defs., and Edward Soto,
Staff Att’y, the Bronx Defs. (Aug. 2, 2022).
287. Id.
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C. The Aftermath of Crawford
For parents like Shamika Crawford, a full stay-away criminal order of
protection had far-reaching consequences.288 Although the appellate court
held that Judge Ally should have held a hearing on the full stay-away order,
the decision left many questions open to interpretation: What information is
required to trigger such a hearing? When is an in-person hearing with live
testimony required? How soon must the hearing be scheduled after it is
requested? Can a hearing be conducted electronically? What is the
appropriate burden of proof?289
Three days after the Crawford decision, the deputy counsel to the Office
of Court Administration290 (OCA) Anthony R. Perri issued a memorandum
to deputy chief administrative judges about the impact of Crawford.291
According to the memorandum, the requirement for a “Crawford hearing” is
triggered only when a defendant pleads that the TOP may cause an immediate
and significant deprivation of a substantial personal or property interest.292
Such deprivation may include a loss in tenancy or ownership, the exclusion
from one’s own home, or a separation of a parent from their child.293 In
Crawford, this burden was clearly met since the defendant was not only
excluded from her residence and separated from her children, but was also in
danger of losing her lease permanently.294
Additionally, the memorandum set forth some components of an adequate
pleading: “[T]he issuing court should review the sworn allegations, the
current DIR, any prior DIRs, and any other evidence proffered and hear the
defense and prosecution out fully on the record before exercising its
independent judgment.”295 However, the memorandum instructs that, unless
absolutely necessary and appropriate, courts should not grant motions for full
testimonial hearings because of the significant operational impact and the
serious safety concerns for victims of IPV.296 By demonstrating a clear
preference for refraining from conducting full testimonial hearings, the
memorandum’s guidance informally limited the scope of a Crawford
288. See Newman, supra note 7.
289. See Barry Kamins, The New ‘Crawford’ Hearing: What Will It Look Like?, N.Y.L.J.
(Aug. 2, 2021, 12:15 PM), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2021/08/02/the-newcrawford-hearing-what-will-it-look-like/ [https://perma.cc/PFV6-KP9Z].
290. The OCA operates under Chief Administrative Judge Lawrence K. Marks and
functions as the administrative arm of the court system. See Office of Court Administration
(OCA), N.Y. STATE UNIFIED CT. SYS., https://ww2.nycourts.gov/Admin/oca.shtml
[https://perma.cc/U7HR-7ZLT] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
291. See Memorandum from Anthony R. Perri, Deputy Couns. to the Hons. Vito C. Caruso,
George J. Silver & Edwina G. Mendelson, Deputy Chief Admin. JJ. (June 27, 2021) (on file
with author).
292. See id.
293. See e.g., Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 715 (App. Div. 2021); People v.
Forman, 546 N.Y.S.2d 755, 758 (Crim. Ct. 1989).
294. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 717; see also Memorandum from Anthony R. Perri to the
Hons. Vito C. Caruso et al., supra note 291, at 4.
295. See Memorandum from Anthony R. Perri to the Hons. Vito C. Caruso et al., supra
note 291, at 4.
296. See id.
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hearing. Some commentators have called the memorandum an “explicitly
cynical response” that has served to limit the scope of the Crawford
decision.297 In a letter to Chief Judge Janet DiFiore and Chief Administrative
Judge Lawrence K. Marks, the American Civil Liberties Union, on behalf of
the New York Civil Liberties Union, criticized OCA for overstepping its
authority and usurping the duty of courts to interpret and apply substantive
law.298 Others, however, believe that it is normal practice to issue
memoranda providing context on a case that may have a significant impact
on court operations.299
Moreover, the Crawford decision notes that “[t]his Court need not
articulate the precise form of the evidentiary hearing required.”300 However,
its failure to address the requirements of these hearings in more detail has led
to judges’ inconsistent compliance.301 Although some defense attorneys
have had success in using the Crawford holding to the benefit of their
clients,302 others have reported that judges are still not holding the required
evidentiary hearings.303 Some public defenders in New York City have
observed that instead of granting the full evidentiary hearing that Crawford
requires, courts are now granting more limited orders of protection at
arraignment.304
Additionally, because the decision does not actually specify that live
witness testimony is necessary,305 prosecutors continue to present the same
evidence at hearings that is set forth in criminal complaints.306 This is
problematic because—as was the case for Ms. Crawford—these criminal
complaints can be vague, unsubstantiated, and lack evidence of the
defendant’s specific role in the incident.307 Some prosecutors present police
reports that have not been substantiated or corroborated.308 The use of
criminal complaints or police reports as a basis for issuing TOPs presents a
real problem for defendants whose cases will ultimately be dismissed, but for
297. Sam Mellins, New York Judges Lock the Accused Out of Their Homes, Skirting Review
Required by Landmark Ruling, Critics Charge, THE CITY (July 23, 2021, 5:00 AM),
https://www.thecity.nyc/2021/7/23/22589634/new-york-judges-lock-out-accused-despiteruling [https://perma.cc/8AHA-FDPZ].
298. See Letter from Am. Civ. Liberties Union of N.Y., to the Hons. Janet DiFiore, C.J.,
and Lawrence K. Marks, Chief Admin. J. (Sep. 30, 2021) (on file with author) (expressing
serious concern that OCA is instructing judges on how to interpret and apply substantive law
through communications not disclosed to the public).
299. See Mellins, supra note 297.
300. Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 717 (App. Div. 2021).
301. See Mellins, supra note 297.
302. See id.
303. See id.; see also Video Interview with Eli Northrup and Edward Soto, supra note 286.
304. Video Interview with Eli Northrup and Edward Soto, supra note 286. Since the
requirements of Crawford are only triggered when a defendant is at risk of being deprived of
a significant property or liberty interest, granting more limited TOPs could be a solution for
allowing judges to avoid the hearing entirely. See Crawford, 150 N.Y.S. 3d at 717.
305. See Memorandum from Anthony R. Perri to the Hons. Vito C. Caruso et al., supra
note 291.
306. See Mellins, supra note 297.
307. See Newman, supra note 7; see also Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 9.
308. See Mellins, supra note 297.
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whom TOPs will nonetheless have severe consequences.309
Kate
Mogulescu, a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, has raised concerns
about whether using uncorroborated police reports to argue for orders of
protection aligns with the spirit of the Crawford decision.310
In response to Crawford, New York State legislators introduced the
Promoting Pre-Trial (PromPT) Stability Act.311 This bill is intended to
address the ambiguity in the First Department’s decision and standardize the
practice of issuing TOPs in New York State criminal courts.312 The bill
proposes the addition of a new section, section 530.15, to the New York
Criminal Procedure Law, as well as a modification to New York Criminal
Procedure Law section 530.30 that would address the issuance of TOPs.313
The memorandum in support of the bill states that prosecutors request TOPs
based “almost entirely on the representation of law enforcement officers who
act with incomplete information and biases.”314 Consequently, TOPs are
issued against people who may be defending themselves, regardless of who
the initial aggressor was.315
Unlike other states and the District of Columbia, New York does not have
a statute that provides an opportunity for the accused to be heard in cases
where TOPs are issued.316 The bill would remedy this disparity and provide
additional clarity on the evidentiary hearing requirements.317 Specifically,
section 530.15 would require the court to hold an evidentiary hearing on the
TOP, during which the prosecution must show by clear and convincing
evidence that the TOP is the “least restrictive means of protecting a
designated witness or complainant from intimidation or injury.”318 This
means that in order to issue a full stay-away order against the accused, the
prosecutor would need to show that such an order was necessary and that
issuing a limited TOP would not sufficiently protect the complainant.319 The
bill also prescribes when such a hearing must be held: the hearing must occur
within three days of a defendant’s request.320 This requirement removes the
ambiguity surrounding the meaning of a “prompt” hearing.321 Additionally,
309. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3.
310. See Mellins, supra note 297 (“That’s just restating the facts that are usually recited in
the [criminal] complaint. That doesn’t seem to fill the role that the Crawford court is
envisioning.”).
311. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
312. See id.
313. Id.
314. See Memorandum in Support of Legislation, A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y.
2021),
https://nyassembly.gov/leg/?bn=A%2C4558&term=0&Summary=Y&Memo=Y
[https://perma.cc/X9HM-SVLC] (last visited Sept. 2, 2022).
315. See id.
316. See id.
317. See id.
318. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
319. In Ms. Crawford’s case, the prosecutor would have been required to show that a full
stay-away order of protection was the “least restrictive means” of protecting Mr. Mayers from
intimidation or injury. See id.
320. Id.
321. See Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 717 (App. Div. 2021).
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the government must present witnesses subject to cross-examination.322
And, under the proposed new section, hearsay evidence would be
admissible.323 By allowing hearsay evidence, the bill strikes a balance
between requiring live, in-person testimony and simply reciting the
allegations in a criminal complaint. Although live, in-person testimony has
been lauded for its truth-seeking and confrontational qualities,324 it can pose
a risk for victims of IPV who do not wish to testify.325
At the time of publication, the bill is still in committee and has not been
passed by either the New York State Assembly or the New York State
Senate,326 and the impact of Crawford remains in flux.327
III. CRIMINAL ORDERS OF PROTECTION MUST BE SUBJECT TO STRICTER
PROCEDURAL RESTRICTIONS
The ruling in Crawford has been lauded as a “significant effort by the First
Department,” but many defense attorneys in New York have reported that
courts are still skirting the ruling.328 This part argues that the holding in
Crawford329 was a step in the right direction, but that it did not go far enough
to protect parent defendants’ rights. Part III.A suggests that the Crawford
decision was, in spirit, a huge success for defendants like Ms. Crawford.
Part III.B then argues that the vague language and the failure to articulate
exactly what a Crawford hearing should entail undermine the impact of the
decision on future similar cases. This part further argues that clearer hearing
requirements and a more stringent evidentiary standard are needed when the
issuance of a TOP in criminal court would deprive a defendant of their home
and separate them from their children.
A. Crawford: A Step in the Right Direction
The ruling in Crawford was an enormous feat.330 No defendant should be
forced to leave their home or be separated from their children solely on the
basis of allegations in a vague complaint and without an articulated
reasonable basis to suggest that such an order is necessary.331 The decision
in Crawford provides a path for seeking relief for defendants who have been
separated from their families or criminalized as a perpetrator when, in fact,
322. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
323. Id.
324. See Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 840, 846 (1990) (“It is always more difficult to tell a
lie about a person ‘to his face’ than ‘behind his back.’” (quoting Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012,
1019–20 (1988))).
325. See supra Part II.B.1.
326. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
327. See Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 314.
328. See Mellins, supra note 297.
329. 150 N.Y.S.3d 712 (App. Div. 2021).
330. See Andy Newman, A Judge’s Order Left Her Homeless. A New Ruling Will Help
Others Like Her., N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/06/25/
nyregion/order-of-protection-domestic-violence.html [https://perma.cc/35LK-TSBA].
331. See Memorandum from Anthony R. Perri to the Hons. Vito C. Caruso et al., supra
note 291.
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they are survivors.332 In finding that Judge Ally was wrong to have issued a
full stay-away criminal order of protection without holding a proper hearing,
the First Department recognized a parent defendant’s right to due process.333
Moving forward, Crawford requires that where
there may be an immediate and significant deprivation of a substantial
personal or property interest upon issuance of the TOP, the Criminal Court
should conduct a prompt evidentiary hearing on notice to all parties and in
a manner that enables the judge to ascertain the facts necessary to decide
whether . . . the TOP should be issued.334

For Ms. Crawford, however, the decision came too late. The eighty-eight
days that she spent living out of her car and with friends335 cannot be erased,
and time that Ms. Crawford spent separated from her children cannot be
restored.
B. More Is Needed
The ruling in Crawford did not go far enough. The decision left many
questions unanswered and failed to detail what the evidentiary hearings it
requires should entail.336 One way to resolve the ambiguity in the Crawford
decision would be to enact a legislative response. The PromPT Act337 has
been proposed by the New York State Legislature and would codify the
important ruling in Crawford, leaving less room for judges to circumvent the
First Department’s decision.338 Indeed, the legislative history to the bill
indicates that legislators believe that the Crawford ruling has been
undermined and applied in an inconsistent manner by judges in New York
criminal courts.339 Had this bill been law in Ms. Crawford’s case, her case
would have unfolded differently. Under the standard in section 530.15, the
government would have been required to show by clear and convincing
evidence that the full stay-away order they were requesting was the “least
restrictive means of protecting” Mr. Mayers.340 In light of the court’s failure
to make any such factual finding, this burden of proof would not have been
met.
Furthermore, the delay that occurred in Ms. Crawford’s case would not
have been permissible under this new law. Ms. Crawford was arraigned on
November 3, 2019, and a full stay-away order was issued against her at that
time.341 On November 8, the parties returned to court, and Ms. Crawford
requested a due process hearing to determine whether the TOP was actually
332. See Newman, supra note 330.
333. See Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 717.
334. Id. (citations omitted).
335. See Newman, supra note 7.
336. See Mellins, supra note 297; see also Memorandum from Anthony R. Perri to the
Hons. Vito C. Caruso et al., supra note 291.
337. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
338. Id.
339. See Memorandum in Support of Legislation, supra note 314.
340. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
341. Crawford v. Ally, 150 N.Y.S.3d 712, 714 (App. Div. 2021).
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necessary.342 Under section 530.15, the court would have been required to
grant the hearing request and set the next court date for no later than three
days from November 8.343 However, the court rejected her request for a
separate due process hearing and stated that it was “hearing . . . the issues
[now].”344 But the court’s “hearing” was inadequate. Such a hearing under
section 530.15 would have required the government to present witnesses
subject to cross-examination by Ms. Crawford’s attorney and to meet a “clear
and convincing” burden of proof.345
However, the current bill does not address the specific implications for
defendants who are parents.346 The bill should go further and call for special
considerations in circumstances in which an alleged abuser is being excluded
from a shared home where children reside. Such an addition should propose
that when a criminal order of protection has an impact on a parent-child
relationship (i.e., by separating a parent defendant from their child due to
exclusion from a shared residence), the criminal court must address the
possibility of visitation. For instance, in a case where a parent defendant
lives and co-parents with their accuser, the court should be required to
determine the appropriateness of shared custody of the minor child, as well
as the parents’ ability to co-parent through an agreed-upon third party. In the
presence of the court, the parents could identify, through the parent
defendant’s attorney, an appropriate person to help coordinate visitation.
Since the issuance of a full order of protection would preclude the parties
from communicating, addressing the future care and custody of the children
at the hearing would ensure that the parent who is excluded from the shared
residence is able to continue a relationship with their children even after a
TOP is in place.347
Furthermore, when a criminal order of protection has the effect of
removing a child from a parent’s custody—even if the child is not explicitly
named in the TOP—a higher evidentiary burden is critical. The “clear and
convincing” standard articulated in the proposed section to the New York
Criminal Procedure Law does not adequately safeguard a parent defendant’s
fundamental right to the care and custody of their child. In the context of a
civil proceeding, the New York Court of Appeals has articulated that the
standard to be applied is whether removal is necessary to protect the child
from “imminent risk of harm.”348 This standard should also be applied in the
criminal context because both proceedings may result in parent-child
separation.349
342. Id. at 715.
343. See A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021) (requiring evidentiary hearing within
three days of defendant’s request).
344. Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 715.
345. A4558B, 2021 Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2021).
346. See supra Part II.A.
347. See supra Part II.A (discussing parents’ fundamental right to the care and custody of
their children).
348. See supra Part II.A.1 (discussing the removal standard as “imminent risk of harm”).
349. See In re Elizabeth C., 66 N.Y.S. 3d 300, 311–12 (App. Div. 2017). Although In re
Elizabeth C. involved an order of protection that was issued on behalf of the child against the
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Many criminal courts issue orders of protection that are subject to family
court modification, but this unfairly places the burden on parent defendants
to seek recourse for a state-imposed restriction in another court. In situations
where the state has separated a parent and child, the logical remedy cannot
be that the alleged perpetrator should bring suit against the alleged victim for
custody or visitation in another court. Parents who have not been charged
with abuse or neglect cannot avail themselves of the prompt hearing provided
for in sections 1027 and 1028 of the FCA.350 Instead, parents who wish to
modify the criminal court’s TOP in family court would be forced to bring a
visitation or custody suit against the alleged victim. Although it is important
that criminal courts continue to make TOPs subject to family court
modification—especially for parent defendants who already have open cases
in family court—it should not excuse a criminal court from its responsibility
to issue TOPs carefully.
A statutory provision tailored to the concerns of parent defendants
excluded from a shared home would have been instrumental in Ms.
Crawford’s case. It would have required the criminal court to find that
removal was necessary to protect Ms. Crawford’s children from imminent
harm, and this burden would not have been met. Additionally, the court
never addressed visitation when it issued a full order of protection. The court
noted that there were remedies for her to see the children,351 but did not
articulate what those remedies were. Assuming that this remedy was for Ms.
Crawford to seek a modification of the order in family court, this remedy
may have done more harm than good in her case.352 Ms. Crawford did not
have an open case in family court and bringing a custody or visitation suit
against Mr. Mayers could have exposed her and her family to scrutiny by
ACS. Left with no alternatives and no direct order from the criminal court
addressing visitation, Ms. Crawford was separated from her children for
several months.353
When deciding whether to issue an order of protection, judges today are
guided by New York Criminal Procedure Law section 530.12, which lists
several factors for courts to consider.354 Although some courts have
attempted to interpret this statute,355 the statute leaves the decision largely up
to the judge’s discretion. Thus, a legislative provision that requires judges to
justify their decisions at an earlier stage could help mitigate inconsistencies
across New York criminal courts and decrease the number of overly
restrictive orders of protection. One such provision, for example, could
require courts to state on the record at arraignment the specific and articulable
parent, Crawford recognized that heightened due process is necessary in cases where a TOP
between two parents effectively separates one parent from their child. See Crawford, 150
N.Y.S.3d at 717.
350. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT. §§ 1027–1028 (McKinney 2022).
351. See Crawford, 150 N.Y.S.3d at 715.
352. See supra notes 284–87 and accompanying text.
353. See Newman, supra note 7.
354. See supra notes 92–96 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 99–106 and accompanying text.
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facts that justify the issuance of an order of protection. Although the bill
currently provides some clarity on the role of the prosecutor at a subsequent
evidentiary hearing, it does not address the arraignment stage. This proposed
addition not only holds judges accountable at an earlier stage, but also serves
goals of judicial efficiency.
As the memorandum submitted in support of the bill and the remarks of
numerous defense attorneys make clear,356 courts today are not following
Crawford.357 Until there is a legislative solution, judges should be mindful
of the spirit of Crawford and aim to follow the provisions of the proposed
legislation in their own courtrooms. Courts should also pay special mind to
cases involving allegations of IPV between parents with minor children. In
those cases, a higher burden of proof—“imminent risk of harm”—must be
applied to comport with constitutionally required protections. Moreover,
lawmakers should consider codifying these protections to address these
issues.
CONCLUSION
Criminal orders of protection can be valuable tools for dealing with
intimate partner violence, but they are not perfect. Ms. Crawford was
excluded from her home and kept from living with her children for
eighty-eight days on the basis of unsubstantiated, untested allegations that
formed the basis of a proceeding that was ultimately dismissed. Unless and
until the New York State Legislature passes the PromPT Act and clarifies the
many questions that the First Department in Crawford left unanswered,
defendants—and especially parent defendants—are at the mercy of judges
deciding whether to provide a timely hearing on the underlying allegations
of abuse. These cases are even more complicated when there are children
involved. When a parent defendant faces separation from their child as an
indirect consequence of a criminal TOP, heightened due process protections
are necessary and constitutionally required. In order to adhere to these
requirements, the New York State Legislature should add a provision that
addresses visitation and another provision dictating the proper evidentiary
standard in these cases: “imminent risk of harm.”

356. See supra Part II.C (explaining that Crawford’s vague decision has enabled courts to
circumvent the holding).
357. See Mellins, supra note 297.

